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Abstract 
 
Teacher turnover has adverse consequences for student achievement and imposes large financial 
costs for schools. Some have argued that high-stakes testing may lower teachers’ satisfaction with 
their jobs and could be a major contributor to teacher attrition. In this paper, we exploit changes in 
the tested grades and subjects in Georgia to study the effects of eliminating high-stakes testing on 
teacher turnover and the distribution of teachers across grades and schools. To measure the effect 
of testing pressures on teacher mobility choices we use a "difference-in-differences" approach, 
comparing changes in mobility over time in grades/subjects that discontinue testing vis-à-vis 
grades/subjects that are always tested. Our results show that eliminating testing did not have an 
impact on the likelihood of leaving teaching, changing schools within a district, or moving between 
districts. We only uncover small negative effects on the likelihood of grade switching. However, 
we do find relevant positive effects on retention of beginning teachers in the profession. In 
particular, the average probability of exit for teachers with 0-4 years of experience fell from 14 to 
13 percentage points for teachers in grades 1 and 2 and from 14 to 11 percentage points in grades 
6 and 7. 
 
Keywords:  Teacher turnover; High-stakes Testing; Accountability Pressure; Difference-in-
differences approach
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I. Introduction 
Teacher turnover is found to have adverse consequences for student achievement (Ronfledt 
et al., 2013) and to impose large financial costs for schools (Barnes, Crowe, & Schaefer, 2007; 
Birkeland & Curtis, 2006; Milanowski & Odden, 2007).  Turnover is especially problematic 
among early-career teachers, with 17 percent leaving the profession within their first five years 
(Gray & Taie, 2015).  Some have argued that high-stakes testing lowers teachers’ job satisfaction 
and is thus a major contributor to teacher attrition.1  This in turn has fueled calls for a reduction in 
the amount of mandatory statewide testing.  
High-stakes testing could also affect the distribution of teachers across grades and across 
schools.  Within a school, principals might allocate their more experienced or higher-performing 
teachers to tested grades in response to accountability pressure (Grissom, Kalogrides and Loeb, 
2017).  Similarly, teachers may have a greater incentive to flee schools with low-performing 
students if their students are subject to high-stakes testing.2  If high-performing teachers switch to 
schools with more advantaged students this in turn could exacerbate differences in school quality. 
Changes in Georgia’s testing practices present a unique opportunity to study the effect of 
testing on teacher turnover, the distribution of teachers across grades within schools and the 
variation in quality across schools.  Over the last decade, Georgia has experienced four different 
testing regimes with variation in both subjects tested and grade levels in which testing occurred.  
This includes dropping all statewide achievement tests in some grades, eliminating some subject 
                                                          
1 In a recent survey of Georgia teachers, “the number and emphasis of mandated tests” was ranked as the most 
prominent among eight often-cited reasons that teachers leave the profession.  See Owens (2015). 
2 Teachers would have an incentive to leave if either accountability is based on student achievement (rather than on 
growth), or if the evaluation system does not fully account for student/family characteristics, resulting in biased 
estimates of productivity for schools and teachers serving high proportions of disadvantaged students.  
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areas from testing in all grades and reducing the number of grades in which certain subject areas 
are tested.  
Given concerns over testing and its effects on teachers’ labor market decisions, we seek to 
derive causal estimates of the impact of testing on teacher mobility by analyzing the effects of 
changes in mandated testing in Georgia.  Previous studies have looked at the effect of establishing 
a statewide accountability system or the impact of accountability pressure within an established 
system on teacher mobility.  However, our focus is somewhat different.  Driven by federal 
mandates in the No Child Left Behind Act and incentives associated with the Race to the Top 
competition, most states have established test-score based metrics of school performance and 
associated accountability systems.  However, the recent Every Student Succeeds Act (ESSA) 
grants more flexibility over testing requirements to states.  Thus, the debate has shifted toward the 
extent of testing within pre-existing accountability structures.  We therefore strive to understand 
the implications of altering the grades and subjects tested on teachers’ labor market choices.  In 
particular, we seek to answer the following research questions: 
1. Does reducing the number of tested subjects (or eliminating testing entirely) affect the 
likelihood teachers will switch schools or exit the profession? 
2. Does reducing the number of tested subjects (or eliminating testing entirely) affect the 
likelihood that teachers will change grade assignments? 
3. Does reducing the number of tested subjects (or eliminating testing entirely) alter the 
distribution of school quality? 
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II. Literature Review 
Most prior research focuses on the effects of establishing test-based accountability systems 
or differential pressure faced by schools within those systems.  Early work by Clotfelter, et al. 
(2004) and a subsequent study by Fuller and Ladd (2013) study the impact on teacher labor markets 
of the introduction of a statewide accountability system in North Carolina in 1996/97.  The system 
not only established a test-based grading system for schools, it also created a bonus system 
whereby teachers in the highest-rated (“exemplary”) category received bonuses of $1500.  
Clotfelter, et al. compare retention rates of new teachers in low-performing elementary schools in 
North Carolina two years prior to the introduction the school accountability system with attrition 
of new teachers in the first year the accountability system was in place.  Estimating hazard models 
of teacher exit, they find that post reform, the probability that first-year teachers in low-performing 
school leave increased.   
Fuller and Ladd extend the analysis period to 1994/95 through 2008/09, which allows them 
to investigate both the effects of the initial state-based school accountability system established in 
1996/97 and the later federal No Child Left Behind Act, which began in 2002/03.  They compare 
elementary school teachers in kindergarten through second grade, where testing did not occur, to 
teachers in grades three through five, where statewide testing occurred.  Estimating logit 
regressions of the probability of moving up from untested lower elementary grades to tested upper 
elementary grades and vice-versa.  Consistent with the notion that principals seek to maximize test 
scores in response to accountability pressure, the authors find that movement of teachers from 
lower to upper-elementary grades increases in both the state-based and federal NCLB 
accountability regimes.  They also show that in the NCLB era higher quality teachers (as measured 
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by licensure test scores) were more likely to move from the lower elementary to upper elementary 
grades.  Further, in the NCLB era higher-value-added teachers were less likely to move down from 
the upper-elementary to lower-elementary grades. 
Perhaps the work that is closest to the present study is an analysis of the institution of 
statewide testing in selected grades in New York State by Boyd et al. (2008).  In 1998/99, New 
York established new statewide exams in grades four and eight and produced public report cards 
of individual school performance based on the test score results.  A year later, the state adopted a 
school accountability system that established performance standards.  Under this system, failure 
to meet standards triggered a planning process and schools that continued to not meet the standards 
were labeled “in need of improvement” and could eventually be dissolved.  However, there were 
no direct consequences for teachers until the 2002/03 school year.  Boyd et al. utilize a logit 
analysis to compare rates of teacher exit from grade four to the departure-from-grade rates of 
teachers in grades one, two, three, five and six.  They find that the turnover rate of fourth-grade 
teachers decreased relative to teachers in other elementary grades after testing began.  They further 
distinguish between inter-grade movement and exit from public school teaching by estimating 
multinomial logit models of the choice between remaining in the same grade, switching grades 
and exiting public school teaching.  First-year teachers were 25 percent less likely to leave the 
fourth grade after testing began, but there was no statistically significant impact on the likelihood 
that fourth grade teachers left the public school system after testing began.  
Sun, Saultz and Ye (2017) analyze the effects of school accountability on teacher turnover 
by comparing the pre- and post-NCLB periods in states with pre-existing state accountability 
systems to the changes over time in states that did not have school accountability systems in place 
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prior to the institution of NCLB.  To conduct the analysis they utilize data from the nationally 
representative Schools and Staffing Surveys and associated Teacher Follow-Up Surveys from 
1993–2009.  Neither the states with pre-existing systems nor the states without school 
accountability prior to NCLB experienced any significant change in voluntary between-school 
mobility or attrition from the profession.  However, they find that with the introduction of NCLB, 
involuntary teacher inter-school mobility and attrition increased in states lacking prior 
accountability systems relative to those that had state accountability systems in place before the 
federally mandated accountability system under NCLB.   
In contrast to prior work that exploits the initiation of accountability systems to identify 
the impact of test-based measures of school performance on teacher mobility, two recent papers, 
Feng, Figlio & Sass (2018) and Dizon-Ross (2018) utilize variation in accountability pressure 
within an established accountability system to identify impacts on teacher labor-market decisions.  
Using data from Florida, Feng, Figlio & Sass exploit a change in the way that school grades were 
assigned to measure the impact of an unanticipated change in the grade a school received on 
teacher turnover.  Using both difference-in-differences and regression discontinuity strategies, 
they find that school grading shocks do not affect teacher mobility decisions in most schools, but 
do have significant impacts in schools that unexpectedly receive a failing grade.  Teachers in 
schools that receive an “F” rating are significantly more likely to leave the school and the turnover 
increase is disproportionately higher among the best teachers (as measured by estimated impacts 
on student test scores).  Employing a regression discontinuity design, Dizon-Ross obtains rather 
different results for teachers and schools in New York City.  For schools rated C and below, those 
just below the C/D or D/F threshold have lower rates of teacher turnover than schools just above 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530939
  
8 
 
the threshold.  Dizon-Ross argues that the local decrease in turnover is likely due to accountability 
pressure driving principals to make improvements in the school environment that make the school 
more desirable to teachers and this outweighs negative stigma effects from a lower school grade. 
III. Background and Data 
In Georgia, statewide testing was first mandated by the A+ Education Reform Act of 2000.3  
The Act required that students in grades 1-8 be tested in reading, English/language arts, and math.  
Students in grades 3-8 were also required to be tested annually in science and social studies.  
Initiation of the testing regime was left to the discretion of the State Board of Education.  Beginning 
in spring 2000, all students in grades four, six, and eight were required to take the Criterion-
Referenced Competency Tests (CRCT) in reading, English/language arts, and math. In spring 
2002, testing in these three subjects was expanded to include students in all grades 1 through 8.  
Also in spring 2002, science and social studies tests were added for students in grades 3-8.  Testing 
of reading, English/language arts and math competencies in grades 1-8 and assessments in science 
and social studies in grades 3-8 continued through spring 2010.  Due to budget constraints 
associated with the Great Recession, the state stopped administering the CRCT in grades one and 
two; beginning in school year 2010/11 (henceforth 2011), end-of-grade exams were only given to 
students in grades 3-8.4   In 2015 the state adopted a new test, Georgia Milestones.  In 2015 and 
2016, students in grades 3-8 were tested in ELA, math, science, and social studies.  In 2017, science 
                                                          
3 O.C.G.A. §20-2-281.  The Act also required end-of-course assessments in grades 9-12. 
4 On April 29, 2010, the Georgia Legislature adopted a budget that instructed the Georgia Department of Education 
(GaDOE) to eliminate CRCT testing in grades 1 and 2.  Governor Perdue subsequently vetoed that provision and 
gave the GaDOE the authority to continue testing in June 2010.  However, the associated budget cuts remained and 
the GaDOE choose not to administer CRCT tests in grades 1 and 2 in the 2010/11 school year “due to budgetary 
constraints.”  See Perdue and Dlugolenski (2010).   
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and social studies testing was scaled back to grades 5 and 8, while students in grades 3-8 were still 
tested in ELA and math. The patterns of testing over our sample period are summarized in Table 
1. The plausibly exogenous changes in tested grades and subjects over time provide us with a 
unique opportunity to estimate the effects of eliminating mandatory testing on teacher mobility 
decisions, the allocation of teachers across grades within schools and the distribution of school 
quality. 
We employ data from Georgia’s statewide longitudinal database, Georgia’s Academic and 
Workforce Analysis and Research Data System (GA•AWARDS).  GA•AWARDS combines data 
from all educational agencies in Georgia as well as unemployment insurance (UI) records from 
the Georgia Department of Labor.  Thus, individual students can be tracked from pre-K through 
post-secondary institutions and into the labor force.  The database includes data from the 2007 
school year forward; thus our sample includes students in grades K-12 for the years 2007 through 
2018.  We limit our analytical sample to teachers in grades one through eight.5   
IV. Econometric Methods 
To measure the effect of reducing accountability pressures on teacher mobility choices we 
will use a "difference-in-differences" approach, comparing changes in mobility over time in 
grades/subjects that discontinue testing vis-à-vis grades/subjects that are always tested. A 
difference-in-differences strategy will allow us to make causal inferences under the assumption 
                                                          
5Given that kindergarten students have not been subject to statewide testing, we do not include kindergarten teachers 
in our analytical sample. Their inclusion, however, does not affect the results. 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530939
  
10 
 
that teachers in always-tested and (eventually) non-tested grades and subjects follow the same 
trend in outcome variables prior to changes in test coverage.  
To model turnover, we estimate multinomial logit hazard models, as in Feng and Sass 
(2017). Five choices are studied:  (i) remain in the present school and grade, (ii) remain in the 
present school but change grade, (iii) transfer to another school within district, (iii) transfer out of 
the district and (iv) exit teaching in K-12 public schools in Georgia.  Our models control for teacher 
characteristics such as gender, race/ethnicity, teaching experience, educational attainment, 
pathway to teaching and the institution attended for traditional teacher preparation program 
completers.  The models also control for school-level student body demographics such as school 
enrollments, the proportion of students eligible for free-and-reduced-price lunch, the proportion of 
students with disabilities, the proportion classified as English language learners and shares from 
different races/ethnicities. 
To further study the impact of eliminating testing requirements on the allocation of teachers 
across grades, we also estimate a binary choice logit model of whether or not a teacher changes 
grades from one year to the next as a function of the extent of state-mandated testing in the relevant 
grade level.  This model also includes controls for teacher and school characteristics as described 
above.   
In order to gauge the impact of test-based accountability pressure on the distribution of 
school quality, we first estimate linear regression models of student achievement in both math and 
ELA, where current achievement is a function of prior achievement, student characteristics and 
peer characteristics.  The achievement models also include school indicators (school fixed effects) 
which yield so-called “value added” estimates of school effectiveness. We then study changes in 
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the distribution of school effectiveness as a function of changes in testing policies using a 
Kolgomorov-Smirnov equality-of-distribution test.  If school testing policies affect the distribution 
of teachers across schools, and hence the distribution of school quality, we would expect greater 
changes in the distribution of school quality when grade or subject-area testing changes.  We would 
also anticipate larger differences in grade groups where there are more substantial changes (e.g. 
elementary) than in grade groups where testing regimes were more stable (e.g. high school). 
A. Teacher Turnover 
We model a teacher’s decision about job change as an individual utility maximizing 
problem over a number of job choices.6  A teacher will select among a group of jobs based on her 
individual preferences and the characteristics of the job, including testing requirements. A teacher 
will compare the available options and select the job that yields the highest present value of 
expected utility.  The decision facing a teacher during each time period t is represented by: 
𝑀𝑎𝑥 𝑃𝑉 𝑈 ,𝑈 , 𝑈 , 𝑈 , 𝑈 ,  where 𝑈 = 𝑓(𝑫 ) (1) 
where the subscript kgmrt indicates teacher k, teaching grade g, in school m and district r at time 
t. Dkgmrt, represents a vector of control variables that have been shown in the literature to be 
important in influencing a teacher’s mobility decision. These include teacher demographics and 
professional credentials, as well as school characteristics. A teacher’s race and gender are included 
to account for teacher preferences. A teacher’s experience and education level, professional 
certification status, and subject-specific certification are all included to reflect human capital 
                                                          
6 Although we formally model the problem as a one-sided decision, we recognize that some (particularly early-
career) teachers may be subject to involuntary terminations and principals may respond to accountability pressure by 
re-assigning high-performing teachers to tested grades. 
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investments. The effects of non-monetary working conditions on teacher mobility decisions are 
taken into account by including a variety of school characteristics such as enrollment, student 
racial/ethnic composition, the percent of students receiving free or reduced-price lunch (a proxy 
for family income), English language learners and students with disabilities.  
A teacher maximizes his utility by selecting the best of five options.  The five possible 
choices are: stay at the present school and grade (S), move to a different grade within the school 
(G), change school within the school district (C), move between districts to a new school in a 
different school district (D), and leave public school teaching in Georgia (L).  All moves are 
assumed to result from utility-maximizing choices. While this assumption may not be correct in 
cases of involuntary separation due to poor performance or workforce reduction, such cases are 
relatively rare.  
For teachers, most moves and exits occur at the end of the school year. In addition, 
information on schools is typically only available at yearly intervals. Given this discreteness in the 
data, we employ a discrete multinomial logit hazard model with both time-varying and time-
invariant variables. The discrete-time hazard function models the probability that any of the five 
events—staying in the same school and grade, moving grades within a school, moving within the 
district, moving between districts, or leaving—happens to teacher k during period t+1, which is 
conditional on staying in the teaching profession until that time. The discrete-time hazard function 
can be interpreted as the probability of transition at discrete time t+1 given survival up to time t+1: 
, 1 , 1 , 1Pr[ 1 1, ]kgmr t kgmr t kgmr t kmrth T t T t D        (2) 
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Assuming independence of irrelevant alternatives and error terms that are independently and 
identically extreme value distributed, a multinomial logit hazard model specifies the probability 
of choosing each alternative as a function of teacher and school characteristics.  
To capture the effect on teachers’ moves of testing requirements we use a difference-in-
differences approach following this specification for each potential type of move: 
, 1 1 2 3 4( ( )) ( )kmr t j j kgmrt j j t j tLogit h j D E Z E Z           ;  , , , ,j S G C D L    (3) 
where E  is an indicator for teachers in grades that were affected by the testing requirements 
change (i.e. teachers in grades one and two and science or social science teachers in grades six or 
seven). tZ  is an indicator that signifies the period after the testing requirement change (2011 for 
the grades one and two testing change and 2017 for the science and social science change in testing 
for grades six and seven) and tE Z  is the interaction between the two. Our main coefficient of 
interest is the coefficient of this interaction, 4j , which represents the extent that the probability 
of a certain teacher move changed because of the changes in testing requirements.7 We also explore 
heterogeneous effects by teacher experience including an interaction term with an indicator 
variable for early-career teachers, i.e. teachers with less than five years of experience8.  We present 
separate estimates for elementary school teachers in grades one to five, who are affected by the 
                                                          
7 By defining the no-testing period for grades one and two as 2011 and beyond, we are implicitly assuming that 
teachers did not know when making future employment decisions in spring 2010 that there would not be testing in 
grades one and two in school year 2011.  As described in footnote 4 above, there was uncertainty about future 
testing at least as late as June 2010 when Governor Perdue signed the FY 2011 budget.  Though very unlikely, if 
teachers knew that testing in grades one and two would be dropped they might have been more likely to continue 
teaching in 2010/11 (and hence be categorized as a stayer in 2010). We study the potential for these anticipatory 
effects in the robustness section of this paper. 
8 We also estimated models allowing for differential effects for later career teachers but did not find any significant 
differences in the estimated effects in this case. 
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testing change in 2011 if teaching in grades one and two, using data up to school year 2017, before 
the second change took place. We also present separate estimates for middle school teachers in 
grades six to eight, who were affected by the second testing change in 2017 if teaching in science 
or social sciences in grades six and seven, using all data available until school year 2018. We 
believe estimating the models separately for elementary and middle school teachers is the best 
strategy as testing changes affected these two groups of teachers differently. This is so because 
most teachers in elementary school teach all subjects and so will only be affected by the eliminating 
of testing in 2011. Third grade teachers would also in theory be affected by the eliminating of 
testing in science and social science in 2017 but, as they continued to be tested in other subjects, 
they would not be able to avoid testing entirely. Middle school teachers typically teach one subject 
and for them the change in testing in 2017 was subject and grade specific. Then, teachers could 
avoid testing entirely by changing grades in this case.     
B. Teacher Mobility Between Grades 
To further study the effect of testing on movement between grades, we define an indicator 
for the teacher moving grades independently of doing so within or across different schools. Similar 
to our difference-in-differences approach explained above, we estimate simple logit hazard models 
of the following form: 
  1 2 3 40 ( )kgmrt t ti Dlogi t E Z E Zt             (4) 
where all the variables are described as above.  
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C. Changes in School Quality 
To study changes in the distribution of school quality due to the testing policy change, we 
model the contribution of school 𝑚 to the test score (𝑌) of student 𝑖 at time 𝑡 and in grade 𝑔 
following this value-added model for each year separately: 
𝑌 = 𝛿 + 𝛿 𝑌 + 𝛿 𝑋 + 𝛿 𝐺 + 𝛾 + 𝛼 + 𝜀  (5) 
Test scores are standardized within subject (ELA and math), school year, and grade-level; 𝑋  
contains student-level indicator variables for gender, race/ethnicity (Hispanic, Asian, Black, or 
other race), free or reduced price lunch status, and English language learner status; 𝐺  are grade-
level covariates for the proportions of female students, Hispanic students, Asian, Black, or other 
race students, free or reduced price lunch eligible students, English language learner students, and 
students with disabilities in a given grade, as well as grade-level enrollment; and 𝛾  are grade-
level fixed effects. 𝛼  represents a series of school fixed effects capturing our estimates of school 
quality.  
For this analysis we focus on elementary school grades and estimate equation (5) for grades 
4 and 5 for each year of our data separately, starting with the 2008 school year and concluding 
with the 2018 school year. We could estimate equation (5) for grades 2 and 3 in the pre-policy 
change period, but opt to omit them to increase comparability with the post-policy change period 
where we can only estimate the model for grades 4 and 5.9 We test for changes in the distribution 
of school quality resulting from the testing policy change using a non-parametric Kolmogorov-
                                                          
9 Results including grades 2 and 3 in the pre-policy period were, however, similar and are available from the authors 
upon request. 
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Smirnov equality-of-distributions test over the sample period of 2008 through 2018, focusing on 
the first testing change in 2011. 
V. Empirical Results 
A.  Descriptive Analyses 
In Figures 1A-1D we present the proportion of teachers who experienced a given move in 
a certain year. If testing is driving teacher mobility decisions, we would expect the greatest impacts 
on attrition from the profession and within-school grade level changes, as intra-district or inter-
district moves between schools would not necessarily reduce exposure to testing.  Visually, we do 
not observe any differences in attrition, within-school grade changes or inter-school mobility 
trends across grades before and after the testing requirements changed for grades 1 and 2 in 2011. 
We also do not observe significant differences in trends after the change in testing requirements 
for science and social-science teachers in grades 6 and 7.  
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for our sample of first to eight-grade teachers across 
the years of analysis, from 2007 to the 20018 academic year. We present descriptive statistics for 
all teachers together, as well as for early-career teachers (i.e. those with less than five years of 
experience) separately. Twelve and one-half percent of the observations in our sample represent 
moves to leave the teaching profession, 2.6 percent moves to change districts, 4.5 percent moves 
to different schools and 12.6 percent changes of grades taught within the same school10. About 20 
percent of the teachers in our data are early-career teachers with less than five years of experience 
and the majority of teachers are white (75 percent). Early-career teachers present relatively higher 
                                                          
10 We do not find significant differences in these statistics depending on the teacher being an elementary school 
teacher or a middle school teacher. 
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rates of mobility as 14 percent of the observations among early-career teachers represent moves to 
leave the teaching profession, five percent moves across districts, six percent moves within district 
across schools and 14 percent moves within school across grades. Schools have on average about 
half of their student body that is white, 37 percent African American, 14 percent Hispanic and 
about three percent Asian or other ethnicities. Schools on average have about 58 percent of their 
student body that qualifies for Free-Reduced lunch, about eight percent are English Language 
Learners and about 13 percent are students with disabilities. 
B.  Quantitative Analyses – Teacher Turnover 
Table 3 presents average marginal effects from a multinomial logit hazard model of teacher 
mobility, as described in (2). Panel A presents estimated effects of the removal of testing 
requirements for first and second grade that took place in 2011 using the sample of elementary 
school teachers teaching in grades one to five. Panel B presents estimated effects for the removal 
of testing requirements for science and social science teachers in grades six and seven in 2017 
including data from teachers in grades six to eight11. Estimates control for teacher and school 
characteristics. In particular, the following variables are also included as controls: an indicator for 
female teachers, an indicator for early-career teachers (less than five years of experience), four 
indicators for a teacher’s race/ethnicity (Hispanic, Asian, African-American and other), five 
indicators for a teacher’s level of educational attainment (high school, associate’s degree, master’s 
degree, education specialist and doctorate), three indicators for teachers with special certification 
(special education, English as a second language, gifted), an indicator teachers who received an 
                                                          
11 In the multinomial choice analyses, we restrict the sample to teachers in grades one to five and grades six to eight, 
respectively, but moves include all grade levels.  Thus, for example, if a teacher starts in grade five and transfers to a 
middle school in the same district they would be classified as a within-district mover, but in the following years their 
observations are censored as they would no longer be part of the analytical sample. 
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education degree from the state of Georgia during our data time frame,  the proportion of students 
in the school from different ethnicities (Hispanic, Asian, African American, other), the proportion 
of students in the school that qualify for free or reduced-priced lunch, the proportion of students 
in the school that are English Language Learners, the percentage of students with disabilities in 
the school and number of students enrolled in the school. Finally, standard errors are clustered at 
the teacher level. 
As can be seen in the estimates presented in the columns labeled as (1), in Panel A, overall, 
we do not observe significant effects of eliminating testing in grades one and two on the probability 
of leaving the teaching profession, changing districts or changing schools within a district. We do 
observe, however, a small but statistically significant negative effect of eliminating testing on the 
probability of changing grades within schools. After the policy change, the probability of changing 
grades within the same school for first and second-grade teachers fell by 0.5 percentage points 
(relative to a mean of 12.6 percent). In general, turnover is lower among first and second grade 
teachers, compared to teachers in grades three through five. After the testing changes in 2011, we 
observe higher overall probabilities of changing districts and changing grades, lower probabilities 
of changing schools and no change in the likelihood of leaving the profession. Early-career 
teachers are observed to have overall higher levels of turnover. They are about two percentage 
points more likely to change district, change schools within the district, and move grades. 
In the estimates presented in the columns labeled as (2), we allow for different effects of 
the testing changes on the mobility decisions of early-career teachers. Looking at the changes in 
testing in grades one and two we observe that early-career first and second grade teachers are 0.9 
percentage points less likely to leave the profession (a 6 percent reduction relative to a mean of 14 
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percentage points) after the elimination of testing and about 0.4 percentage points more likely to 
change districts. 
Panel B of Table 3 shows estimates of the impact of the discontinuation of testing for 
science and social science teachers in grades six and seven that took place in 2017. Similarly to 
the results presented in panel A for eliminating testing in grades one and two, we observe no 
general effect of this test change on either mobility across grades, schools and districts, or exit 
from public-school teaching.  Early-career science and social science teachers of grades six and 
seven, however, do present a reduction of 2.8 percentage points in the probability of leaving the 
profession after the change in testing requirements.  This is a 20 percent reduction in the probability 
of exit.  
C.  Quantitative Analyses – Teacher Overall Mobility Between Grades 
To further study the effects of the testing policy change on the probability of changing 
teaching grades, we also estimate logit hazard models, as described in (4) above. The dependent 
variable in these models takes a value of one if the teacher changed grades from one year to the 
next, whether or not they changed schools.  Our estimates control for teacher and school 
characteristics as described above and again, standard errors are clustered at the teacher level.  
Table 4, panel A, presents the estimated average marginal effects for the discontinuation 
of testing in grades one and two. In this case, we fail to find any effect of the testing change in the 
probability of first and second grade teachers changing grades. We also find no differential effect 
of the testing policy change for early-career teachers. Results are similar for the discontinuation of 
testing of science and social science teachers as presented in Panel B.    
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D.  Quantitative Analyses – Changes in School Quality 
Figures 2a and 2b display the kernel densities of estimated school value-added 
contributions for ELA and math, respectively, using our model presented in (5) above. In both 
plots, the solid line represents the distribution of school quality prior to the testing policy change 
while the dashed line represents the distribution of school quality after the policy change. In both 
math and reading, we reject the null hypothesis of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality-of-
distributions test that the distributions pre- and post-policy change are the same at any level of 
significance. However, changes in the distribution appear small. Table 5 provides summary 
statistics of our value-added estimates for 4th and 5th grade pre- and post-policy testing change in 
2011 for ELA and math. The mean of the distributions for ELA is lower in the post-policy period, 
but is higher for math in the post-policy period. However, the differences between pre-policy 
school quality and post-policy school quality in grades four and five are generally small. It is is, 
however, not surprising that these effects in school quality appear to be small, given the limited 
overall estimated effects of the testing policy change on teacher mobility. 
VI.  Robustness Checks  
A key assumption for our difference-in-differences empirical strategy is that teachers in 
always-tested and (eventually) non-tested grades and subjects follow the same time trend in 
outcome variables prior to changes in test coverage.  To further study the plausibility of this 
assumption, we expanded the model presented in (3) to allow for differential leads and lag effects 
for the different years of data following this model: 
1
, 1 1
1
( ( )) ( ) ( )
m
kmr t j j kgmrt g t t t
t q t
Logit h j D E E     


 
         ;  , , , ,j S G C D L  (6) 
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The model then includes teacher grade and time indicators for each grade and year in the 
sample dataset and allows for differential lead effects before treatment and lag effects after 
treatment per year, using the year before the policy change as reference.  For the common trends 
assumption to be satisfied lead effects should not be statistically significant.  
 Figures 3.A and 3. B show the estimated lead and lag effects for the change in testing 
grades one and two in 2011 and the change in testing science and social science teachers in 2017, 
respectively.  Overall, leads effects are close to zero and not statistically significant with a few 
exceptions (marked in black if statistically significant at the 95% level), for teachers in grades 
one to five affected by the 2011 policy change. Some more lead effects appear significant, 
however, for the case of teachers affected by the change in testing in science in social science in 
2017, especially as it concerns the probability of changing schools.  Estimates for this second 
testing change should be then taken more cautiously as there is less supporting evidence in this 
case for the common trends assumption to be satisfied. However, our general results were robust 
to limiting the analysis to years where the common trend assumption appears to be satisfied, 
years 2012 onwards.12 
 As a robustness check we also estimated binary logit duration models for the decision of 
leaving the profession alone, as well as for the decisions of changing districts and changing 
schools but without changing grades in these latter moves. For the binary logit duration model 
for the decision of leaving the profession, we expected to find similar results to those of the 
multinomial logit hazard models discussed above. As reported in Appendix Table A.2 overall we 
                                                          
12 Results of this analysis can be found in the Appendix Table A.1. 
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found comparable results in this case. In contrast, the models of the decisions of changing 
districts or schools but no changing grades, act like placebo outcomes and, in the absence of bias, 
we should find null effects on these. Results are presented in the Appendix Tables A.3 and A.4. 
Overall, we do not find an effect on the probability of changing districts or schools without 
changing grades. We only find a marginally significant effect of eliminating testing on the 
probability of changing districts in the specification that allows for differential treatment effects 
for beginning teachers. These effects are also an order of magnitude smaller than the estimated 
significant effects on the probability of leaving the profession. Therefore, based on these results, 
we believe that the evidence of bias, if any, appears to be weak.  
 Finally, as the second test change that took place in 2017 only affected science and 
social-science teachers in grades six and seven, we could also perform a difference-in-
differences-in-differences analysis, first comparing turnover rates of science and social-science 
teachers in grades six and seven with turnover rates of teachers in other subjects in the same 
grades and subtract the differences in turnover rates across subjects using information for 
teachers in eight grade. In particular, we follow this difference-in-differences-in differences 
specification: 
, 1 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 7
( ( ))
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
kmr t j j kgmrt j j j t
j j t j t j t
Logit h j D S E Z
S E S Z E Z S E Z
    
   
      
       
;  , , , ,j S G C D L     (7) 
Where S  is an indicator for a teacher teaching science or social-science, E  is an indicator for 
teachers in grades that were affected by the testing requirements change (i.e. six or seven). tZ  is 
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an indicator that signifies the period after the testing requirement change (2017). Our main 
coefficient of interest in this case is the coefficient of the triple interaction, 7j .  
In the absence of violations of the common trends assumption that differences in turnover 
rates across subjects observed for eight grade teachers are comparable to the differences we 
would have observed across subjects for six and seven grade teaches in the absence of the change 
of testing, we expect to find similar results than those presented above using a difference-in-
differences approach and using both teachers in other subjects and teachers in eighth grade 
together as control. Our results are presented in Table 6. Using a triple-differences approach, we 
still find a significant negative effect of eliminating testing on the probability of leaving the 
profession for beginning teachers of about three percentage points. However, using this approach 
we also now find significant negative effects on the probability of changing schools within 
district for all teachers of about two percentage points. These estimated effects for changing 
schools within district, however, disappear if we consider binary logit specifications that do not 
allow changes in grades as a result of the school change.13    
VII. Discussion and Conclusions 
There is growing concern over shortages of teachers and some have argued that testing is 
contributing to the shortage by driving teachers out of the profession.  There is little direct 
evidence, however, on whether this is indeed the case.  Some previous studies have investigated 
the relationship between testing and teacher turnover, but they are based on situations where testing 
was simultaneously instituted along with other changes to school accountability.  In contrast, we 
                                                          
13 Results of these binary logit difference-in-difference-in-differences models are presented in the Appendix Tables 
A.5, A.6 and A.7. 
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consider how eliminating testing in certain grades within an established accountability system 
affects teacher labor market decisions. 
Exploiting the elimination of testing in grades one and two and for science and social 
science teachers in grades six and seven in Georgia, we find that the removal of statewide 
achievement tests had no effect on the likelihood of leaving teaching in general, nor did it impact 
the probability of changing schools within a district or the probability of moving between districts 
for teachers as a whole.  We did find that eliminating testing in the lower elementary grades 
reduced the likelihood of teachers switching grades, but the effect was small.  Thus, overall, we 
find no support for the notion that testing alone is having a major impact on overall teacher attrition 
or, conversely, that reducing the amount of testing will reduce teacher shortages. However, we did 
find a meaningful reduction in the probability of early-career teachers leaving the profession when 
testing requirements were relaxed.  In particular, the average probability of exit for teachers with 
0-4 years of experience fell from 14 to 13 percentage points for teachers in grades one and two 
and from 14 to 11 percentage points in grades six and seven. 
We also investigated the net impact of eliminating testing in grades one and two on the 
distribution of school quality in elementary school grades four and five.  If eliminating testing in 
the early elementary grades reduces the incentive for high quality teachers to leave low-performing 
schools, it could reduce inter-school variation in quality.  However, consistent with the mobility 
analysis, we find no meaningful change in the distribution of school quality when testing in grades 
one and two was eliminated. 
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Figure 1.A: Percentage of Teachers Leaving the Profession By Grade and Year 
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Figure 1.B: Percentage of Teachers Changing Districts By Grade and Year 
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Figure 1.C: Percentage of Teachers Changing Schools Within District By Grade and Year 
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Figure 1.D: Percentage of Teachers Changing Grades Within School By Grade and Year 
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Figure 2A: Distribution ELA School Value-Added 
 
Figure 2B: Distribution of Math School Value-Added 
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Figure 3A: Leads and Lags Estimated Effects of the 2011 Testing Change 
 
 
Figure 3B: Leads and Lags Estimated Effects of the 2017 Testing Change 
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Table 1.  Tested Grades and Subjects, 2007-2018 
 
Grade Subject 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
1 ELA x x x x         
 Math x x x x         
 Reading x x x x         
 Science             
  Social Studies             
2 ELA x x x x         
 Math x x x x         
 Reading x x x x         
 Science             
  Social Studies             
3 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x   
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x   
4 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x   
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x   
5 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x x x 
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x x x 
6 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x   
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x   
7 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x   
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x   
8 ELA x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Math x x x x x x x x x x x x 
 Reading x x x x x x x x     
 Science x x x x x x x x x x x x 
  Social Studies x x x x x x x x x x x x 
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Table 2: Teacher Sample Descriptive Statistics 
  
  All teachers Early-Career Teachers 
  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Turnover     
Leaving Teaching 0.125 0.330 0.140 0.347 
Changing District 0.026 0.160 0.049 0.216 
Changing School 0.045 0.208 0.059 0.235 
Changing Grades 0.126 0.331 0.143 0.350 
Demographics     
Beginning Teacher 0.199 0.399   
Hispanich Teacher 0.011 0.106 0.018 0.132 
Asian Teacher 0.008 0.088 0.014 0.117 
African American 0.238 0.426 0.279 0.449 
White Teacher 0.753 0.431 0.703 0.457 
Other ethnicity 0.001 0.029 0.001 0.036 
Education/ Certification     
Associates Degree 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.005 
Bachelors Degree 0.252 0.434 0.392 0.488 
Master Degree 0.445 0.497 0.430 0.495 
Education Specialist 0.266 0.442 0.146 0.353 
Doctorate 0.028 0.166 0.013 0.113 
Special Education 0.074 0.262 0.099 0.299 
ESL certified 0.078 0.269 0.085 0.279 
Gifted certified 0.224 0.417 0.105 0.306 
Georgia Education Degree 0.001 0.035 0.002 0.046 
School Characteristics     
Percentage Hispanic 0.143 0.160 0.165 0.187 
Percentage Asian 0.033 0.056 0.035 0.061 
Percentage African American 0.373 0.292 0.436 0.309 
Percentage White 0.504 0.287 0.421 0.291 
Percentage Other Ethniticy 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 
Percentage Free-Reduced Lunch 0.585 0.258 0.623 0.265 
Percentage English Language Learners 0.081 0.124 0.098 0.145 
Percentage with disabilities 0.127 0.040 0.125 0.040 
Enrollment 815.945 611.188 816.409 530.115 
Note: Number of observations = 453,955 teachers in total with 91,529 early-career teachers 
 
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530939
  
35 
 
Table 3: Average Marginal Effect Estimates from Multinomial Logit Hazard Models 
Panel A: Stop Testing for Grades 1 and 2 in 2011-Teachers from Grades 1 to 5 
  Leaving Changing District Changing School Changing Grade 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treated Grades -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.009*** -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change -0.001 -0.000 0.005*** 0.005*** -0.011*** -0.011*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated*After Change 0.001 0.003 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.005* -0.005** 
 (0.002) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Beginning Teacher -0.001 0.001 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.022*** 0.021*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After 
Change  -0.009**  0.004***  0.002  0.005 
    (0.004)   (0.001)   (0.002)   (0.004) 
Note: Number of observations = 295,564. Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics.  Standard errors clustered by teacher 
are presented in parentheses. 
 
  
Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3530939
  
36 
 
Panel B: Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers from Grades 6 to 8 
 
  Leaving Changing District 
Changing School Within 
District 
Changing Grade Within 
School 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treated Grades -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.003** -0.003** -0.002* -0.002* -0.009*** -0.009*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change 0.002 0.002 0.016*** 0.016*** -0.010*** -0.010*** -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
Treated   After Change -0.000 0.006 0.000 0.002 -0.008 -0.009 0.006 0.003 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.003) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008) 
Beginning Teacher 0.002 0.003 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher  Treated  
After Change  -0.028**  -0.006  0.004  0.008 
    (0.013)   (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.013) 
Note: Number of observations = 129,033.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics.  Standard errors  clustered by teacher are 
presented in parentheses.
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Table 4: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Changing Grades 
Panel A: Stop Testing for Grades 1 and 2 in 2011-Teachers from Grades 1 to 5 
  Changing Grades 
Treated Grades -0.111*** -0.111*** 
 (0.014) (0.014) 
After Change 0.085*** 0.085*** 
 (0.012) (0.012) 
Treated*After Change -0.003 -0.005 
 (0.017) (0.018) 
Beginning Teacher 0.220*** 0.217*** 
 (0.011) (0.012) 
Beginning Teacher  Treated  After Change 0.013 
    (0.025) 
Note: Number of observations = 295,563.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics. 
Standard errors clustered by teacher are presented in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers 
from Grades 6 to 8 
  Changing Grades 
Treated Grades -0.115*** -0.115*** 
 (0.016) (0.016) 
After Change 0.058** 0.058** 
 (0.027) (0.027) 
Treated  After Change -0.007 0.016 
 (0.046) (0.050) 
Beginning Teacher 0.211*** 0.214*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) 
Beginning Teacher  Treated  After Change  -0.099 
    (0.087) 
Note: Nobs=129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis  
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Table 5: Summary Statistics of School Quality 
 ELA Math 
 Pre-Policy 
Change 
2008-2010 
Post-Policy 
Change 
2011-2016 
Pre-Policy 
Change 
2008-2010 
Post-Policy 
Change 
2011-2016 
     
5th Percentile -0.1791 -0.2622 -0.2517 -0.2652 
10th Percentile -0.1178 -0.1691 -0.1760 -0.1846 
25th Percentile -0.0484 -0.0684 -0.0965 -0.0783 
Median 0.0027 -0.0005 -0.0244 -0.0009 
75th Percentile 0.0653 0.0530 0.0455 0.0654 
90th Percentile 0.1392 0.1250 0.1232 0.1499 
95th Percentile 0.2322 0.1698 0.1823 0.2099 
     
Mean 0.0158 -0.0174 -0.0195 -0.0114 
Std. Dev 0.4338 0.1557 0.2303 0.1660 
     
Number of 
Observations 579 1845 581 1858 
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Table 6: Average Marginal Effect Estimates from Multinomial Logit Hazard Models- Difference-in-Differences-in-Differences 
Approach. Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers from Grades 5 to 8 
  Leaving Changing District Changing School Changing Grade 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treated Grades 0.003 0.003 -0.006*** -0.006*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 0.006* 0.006* 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
Science and Social Science Teachers -0.011*** -0.011*** -0.003 -0.003 -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Treated Grades *Science and Social Science 0.000 0.000 0.003 0.003 0.006** 0.006** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
After Change -0.002 -0.002 0.012*** 0.012*** -0.014** -0.014** -0.022** -0.022** 
 (0.008) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) (0.009) 
After Change*Treated Grades 0.007 0.007 0.006 0.006 -0.005 -0.005 0.010 0.010 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) (0.010) 
After Change*Science and Social Science 0.005 0.005 0.007 0.007 0.022*** 0.022*** -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.011) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008) (0.008) (0.012) (0.012) 
After Change*Treated Grade* Science and Social Science -0.007 -0.002 -0.008 -0.006 -0.021** -0.022** 0.001 -0.001 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.006) (0.006) (0.010) (0.010) (0.015) (0.015) 
Beginning Teacher 0.002 0.002 0.025*** 0.025*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.011*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher *After*Treated Grade* Science and 
Social Science  -0.028**  -0.006  0.003  0.008 
    (0.013)   (0.005)   (0.009)   (0.013) 
Note: Number of observations = 129,033. Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics.  Standard errors clustered by teacher 
are presented in parentheses.
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APPENDIX TABLES 
Table A.1: Average Marginal Effect Estimates from Multinomial Logit Models Restricting to Years of Common Support 
(2012 onwards)-Grades 6 to 8 
  Leaving Changing District Changing School Changing Grade 
  (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treated Grades -0.004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.002 -0.008*** -0.008*** -0.004 -0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) 
After Change 0.002 0.002 0.011*** 0.011*** -0.004 -0.004 -0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004) 
Treated*After Change -0.004 0.001 -0.001 0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.007) (0.008) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.007) (0.008) 
Beginning Teacher -0.003 -0.002 0.033*** 0.033*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  -0.023*  -0.010  0.005  0.006 
    (0.014)   (0.006)   (0.008)   (0.013) 
Note: Number of observations = 68,244.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics. Standard errors clustered by teacher are 
presented in parentheses.
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Table A.2: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Leaving Teaching 
Panel A: Stop Testing for Grades 1 and 2 in 2011-Teachers from Grades 1 to 5 
  Leaving 
Treated Grades -0.006*** -0.006*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change -0.0007 -0.0006 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated*After Change 0.0009 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher -0.003* -0.0006 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  -0.009** 
    (0.004) 
Note: Number of observations = 295,563.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics. 
Standard errors clustered by teacher are presented in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers 
from Grades 6 to 8 
  Leaving 
Treated Grades -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change 0.0015 0.0015 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
Treated*After Change -0.0003 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) 
Beginning Teacher 0.0004 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  -0.028** 
    (0.013) 
Note: Nobs=129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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Table A.3: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Changing Districts Without Changing Grades 
Panel A: Stop Testing for Grades 1 and 2 in 2011-Teachers from Grades 1 to 5 
  Changing District 
Treated Grades -0.002*** -0.002*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) 
After Change 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Treated*After Change -0.0009 -0.001** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Beginning Teacher 0.006*** 0.005*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  0.002** 
    (0.0008) 
Note: Number of observations = 295,563.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics. 
Standard errors clustered by teacher are presented in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers 
from Grades 6 to 8 
  Changing District 
Treated Grades -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
After Change 0.003*** 0.003*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Treated*After Change 0.002 0.003* 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  -0.003 
    (0.002) 
Note: Nobs=129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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Table A.4: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Changing Schools Without Changing Grades 
Panel A: Stop Testing for Grades 1 and 2 in 2011-Teachers from Grades 1 to 5 
  Changing School 
Treated Grades -0.003*** -0.003*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
After Change -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 (0.0007) (0.0007) 
Treated*After Change 0.00002 0.0002 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Beginning Teacher 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0007) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  -0.001 
    (0.002) 
Note: Number of observations = 295,563.  Models include controls for teacher and school characteristics. 
Standard errors clustered by teacher are presented in parentheses. 
 
Panel B: Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers 
from Grades 6 to 8 
  Changing School 
Treated Grades 0.002*** 0.002*** 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
After Change -0.015*** -0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Treated*After Change -0.004 -0.006 
 (0.004) (0.005) 
Beginning Teacher 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Beginning Teacher *Treated* After Change  0.007 
    (0.007) 
Note: Nobs=129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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Table A.5: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Leaving Teaching-Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences 
Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers from 
Grades 6 to 8 
  Leaving 
Treated Grades 0.003 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Science and Social Science Teachers -0.011*** -0.011*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Treated Grades *Science and Social Science -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.004) 
After Change -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.008) (0.008) 
After Change*Treated Grades 0.007 0.007 
 (0.009) (0.009) 
After Change*Science and Social Science 0.004 0.004 
 (0.011) (0.011) 
After Change*Treated Grade* Science and Social Science -0.007 -0.008 
 (0.013) (0.014) 
Beginning Teacher 0.0002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Beginning Teacher *After*Treated Grade* Science and Social Science  -0.028** 
    (0.013) 
Note: Nobs= 129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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Table A.6: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Changing Districts Without Changing Grades-Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences 
Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers from 
Grades 6 to 8 
  Changing District 
Treated Grades -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.0008) (0.0008) 
Science and Social Science Teachers -0.0007 -0.0007 
 (0.0009) (0.0009) 
Treated Grades *Science and Social Science 0.0006 0.0006 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
After Change 0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change*Treated Grades 0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change*Science and Social Science 0.004 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
After Change*Treated Grade* Science and Social Science -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Beginning Teacher 0.006*** 0.006*** 
 (0.0006) (0.0006) 
Beginning Teacher *After*Treated Grade* Science and Social 
Science  -0.003 
    (0.002) 
Note: Nobs= 129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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Table A.7: Average Marginal Effects from a Logit Hazard Model for the Probability of 
Changing Schools Without Changing Grades--Difference-in-Difference-in-Differences 
Stop Testing for Science/Social Science Teachers Grades 6 and 7 in 2017-Teachers from 
Grades 6 to 8 
  Changing School 
Treated Grades 0.001 0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Science and Social Science Teachers 0.0005 0.0005 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Treated Grades *Science and Social Science 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
After Change -0.010** -0.010** 
 (0.005) (0.005) 
After Change*Treated Grades -0.015** -0.015** 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
After Change*Science and Social Science 0.006 0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) 
After Change*Treated Grade* Science and Social Science 0.0004 -0.002 
 (0.008) (0.009) 
Beginning Teacher 0.004*** 0.004*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Beginning Teacher *After*Treated Grade* Science and Social 
Science  0.007 
    (0.007) 
Note: Nobs= 129,032; Estimates include controls for teacher and school characteristics; Clustered 
standard errors by teacher presented in parenthesis 
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